



4th Quarterly Letter to Investors

31/12/2025

MAGALLANES VALUE INVESTORS, S.A. SGIC

Dear Investor,

Accumulated returns for the year are **+29.02%** for the European fund, **+45.25%** for the Iberian fund and **+23.34%** for the Microcaps fund. Since inception, accumulated returns are **+177.46%**, **+182.25%** and **+73.39%** respectively¹, outperforming their respective benchmarks.

The global economy has shown greater resilience than expected in 2025, supported by more favourable financial conditions, strong investment momentum linked to artificial intelligence and a moderation of trade tensions compared to the peak at the beginning of the year. However, the outlook remains marked by high uncertainty and limited visibility for 2026. According to the OECD, global growth is expected to moderate from 3.2% in 2025 to 2.9% in 2026, with Asia and emerging countries as the main drivers and the effect of tariffs weighing on investment and trade in the short term.

The year began with a period of high volatility following the announcement of a sharp increase in tariffs by the United States, which triggered an initial correction in the markets amid fears of a global recession. As the months passed, the signing of trade agreements (including the one reached between the EU and the US during the summer) led to a sharp recovery in the stock markets. In Europe, growth remains moderate but resilient, and there have also been significant changes in economic policy, such as the expansionary fiscal shift in Germany and the European Union's efforts to mobilise savings towards investment.

In this context, lower inflation has allowed the ECB and the Federal Reserve to cut interest rates. Equities closed the year with significant gains: the S&P 500 rose +17.8% in dollars (although only +3.6% in euros due to the weakness of the dollar), while the MSCI Europe rose close to +17%.

AI: expectations, revolution and economic reality

From a financial perspective, it is reasonable to wonder whether the market is not discounting an overly optimistic scenario surrounding artificial intelligence. The scale of the announced investment (in data centres, semiconductors, electrical networks and computer software) is extraordinary, but much of this effort remains concentrated within the technology ecosystem itself: a small number of companies that develop the models, manufacture the components or capture most of the investment expenditure. Meanwhile, the rest of the business fabric, which represents the real day-to-day economy, still shows uneven adoption, with economic benefits that are less visible and, in many cases, difficult to quantify in terms of margins, efficiency or return on capital.

In this regard, even voices such as that of Satya Nadella, CEO of **Microsoft**, have warned of the risk that artificial intelligence could end up resembling a speculative bubble if its use does not extend beyond the big tech companies and the most developed economies.

¹ See Annex 1 for further details of performance by investment strategy, inception date and class.



In his own words: "The stage of marvelling at flashy demonstrations is over; now it's time to prove that artificial intelligence is good for more than just impressing people"².

The message is optimistic but also demanding: for society to fully embrace it, it must have a positive and tangible impact. And that is precisely where the game will be played from 2026 onwards: to see whether the promises of improved productivity translate into real and widespread progress, or whether, on the contrary, they remain a phenomenon of entertainment.

It is clear that, if done right, artificial intelligence can become one of the most profound technological transformations of recent decades; but to do so, it will have to stop being "magic" and finally become a useful tool.

If this transition to the real economy does not materialise, or if it takes longer than expected to be reflected in economic activity (or does so with lower-than-expected returns), the financial and stock market adjustment could be significant. In many cases, the valuations of companies most closely linked to artificial intelligence, driven by high investor enthusiasm, already discount a particularly demanding scenario for success. When the market is convinced of a narrative of "structural change", it tends to anticipate several years of future growth in current prices, so that any delay or disappointment, however small, can result in sharp corrections.

It would not be the first time this has happened. The history of the markets is full of compelling and seemingly revolutionary stories that ended in investment excesses and, subsequently, sharp corrections: from the canal fever in the United Kingdom in the 18th century, through the railway boom in the 19th century, the American *Nifty Fifty* in the 1970s, to the dot-com bubble in 2000. Artificial intelligence may be a real and profound transformation, but the challenge, as always, is to distinguish between technological potential and the price the market is willing to pay for it.

In any case, it is worth emphasising an important idea: just as railways, canals and the internet ended up transforming the world structurally, we also believe that artificial intelligence will have a profound and lasting impact. We do not question the technology; in fact, it is already making even our work at Magallanes more efficient when it comes to analysing companies. What may be in question is whether the amount of capital invested and the expectations concentrated in a specific part of the market are not excessive today from a stock market perspective.

Magallanes Investment Process

In an environment where artificial intelligence has captured much of the attention of investors and recent returns, Magallanes' lack of exposure to this theme could be interpreted as a structural disadvantage. However, our results show the opposite: not only in 2025, an extraordinary year in which our funds outperformed the European market and many competitors, but also over the more than eleven years since our inception, with returns that have comfortably exceeded the benchmark indices. And this, moreover, in a particularly demanding environment for value investing, and even more so in Europe.

² <https://www.ft.com/content/2a29cbc9-7183-4f68-a1d2-bc88189672e6>



Precisely for this reason, after more than a decade (a period that can be considered fully long term) and following the good results obtained, we believe that now is a good time to refocus on our investment process. Not so much because of the need to "reinvent" it, but because of the convenience of remembering it: in a changing environment, what is truly important is to maintain consistency and discipline. The key has been the same as always: staying true to our principles, our way of analysing companies and, in short, our investment process.

Firstly, our approach to investing (what is commonly referred to as our "investment philosophy") is based on a pragmatic and opportunistic view of value. There is no single fixed formula. We apply investment principles in an imperfect world, where "obvious bargains" are not always available. Therefore, our work focuses on identifying opportunities where price and value are out of alignment, often caused by information asymmetries, temporary imbalances in supply and demand, or specific market dislocations.

This approach to investing means that, at certain times, we may maintain significant exposure to sectors such as shipping, energy, banking, commodities or other areas that, at each stage of the cycle, offer the most attractive set of opportunities. We do not adhere to a predetermined sector allocation: the portfolio is built from the bottom up, seeking out companies with the highest margin of safety.

Our approach is also generalist. We do not have analysts specialising in specific sectors, but rather a team capable of moving quickly between very different industries (telecommunications, banking, chemicals, real estate, etc.). This allows us to allocate analysis time to where the combination of potential return and risk is most interesting at any given time, without wasting time, in a flexible and efficient manner.

In more operational terms, our process is based on several characteristics that we consider essential. The first is the time horizon: we invest with a view to at least five years, preferably seven, and ideally ten. This patience is reflected in historically low turnover, around 15% per annum or less, and an average holding period for companies in the portfolio of approximately seven or eight years.

The second is valuation discipline, always accompanied by strict attention to balance sheet strength. Low multiples matter, but a weak balance sheet can turn an apparent opportunity into a value trap. Therefore, in addition to paying little, we look for financial structures capable of withstanding adverse scenarios.

One of the best protections against permanent capital loss is, quite simply, a solid balance sheet. In fact, we often say internally that "the balance sheet comes before the income statement." The reason is obvious: a company can go through difficult periods, but without a robust financial structure, even a reasonable business can end up irreversibly destroying capital.

Throughout our more than eleven-year history, we have not had a single case of a company disappearing from the portfolio as a result of bankruptcy. And this is no coincidence. Strong balance sheets enable companies to withstand and recover from times of stress, such as the sovereign crisis in southern Europe (especially Greece) in 2015, the crisis in China in 2016, the COVID pandemic in 2020, the war between Russia and Ukraine



that began in 2022 (which, unfortunately, is still ongoing) and, more recently, the resurgence of trade and tariff tensions in 2025.

Thirdly, we manage relatively concentrated portfolios (around 35 companies) with the aim of gaining in-depth knowledge of each investment. And finally, we systematically incorporate qualitative factors: the structural trends of each industry, the quality of the management team, capital allocation, the sector cycle and the regulatory framework.

In our experience, attractive valuation is a necessary condition, but rarely sufficient on its own. A good example of this is the European banking sector: for more than ten years, many banks traded at a fraction of their book value, at prices that could apparently be considered rock bottom. However, we understood that this valuation, however low, was largely justified by the extraordinarily adverse environment facing the sector. This period ended up being long and costly, leading many banks to go bankrupt or undergo painful recapitalisations.

Only later, when we considered that the European banking system was healthier, sufficiently capitalised and in a position to return to healthy and sustainable growth, did we begin to consider investing in some European institutions, with excellent results in the end (we will discuss this point in more detail later).

Risk management

For us, risk is not short-term volatility, but how much we could lose if the investment thesis fails; that is, the risk of a total or partial permanent loss of capital. This definition directly influences how we build the portfolio, so that even when a company's upside potential is high, we may abandon the idea if adverse scenarios imply severe or difficult-to-recover losses on that investment.

This discipline is reflected in a clear position sizing policy. Although not set in stone, an individual investment does not usually exceed 5-6% of the portfolio. Similarly, we also control concentrations by theme or sector, which normally do not exceed 10-15%.

In addition to controlling portfolio weights, our risk management is based on two additional pillars. The first is balance sheet quality, as mentioned above: a solid financial structure is one of the best defences against adverse scenarios and the risk of permanent capital loss. The last, but no less important, aspect is the concept of "margin of safety", understood as the difference between the price we pay for a company and our estimate of its intrinsic value.

In our opinion, the concept of margin of safety is what really gives meaning to effective risk management, because it introduces a cushion against analytical errors, uncertainty or changes in the environment. We therefore focus on the economic risk of each investment rather than traditional statistical measures based on "Greek letters", which, although useful in certain contexts, rarely adequately capture the real risk of permanent capital loss.

Controversial investments: the case of European banks

Our investment process often leads us to take positions that may seem contrary to the prevailing consensus at the time. This is not a particularly comfortable situation (being



contrary rarely is), but neither is it a desire to be rebellious. It is simply the natural consequence of applying our own criteria with discipline and building the portfolio based on the risk/return ratio we see in each opportunity.

Over the years, this approach to investing has led us to incorporate controversial ideas at different points in the cycle. A clear example was our entry into European banking in early 2021, when we began our first purchases in some institutions.

At that time, widespread scepticism towards the sector, combined with our lack of dogma when it comes to investing, allowed us to separate the prevailing sentiment from economic reality. From there, we analysed the situation of European banks in detail and concluded that, beyond an attractive valuation, there were also clearly superior levels of solvency, as well as a reasonable capacity to generate profits sustainably in the future.

In addition, many of the usual ingredients were in place for an investment to be rejected by most investors (and, particularly strikingly, by a large part of the major international investment banks). At that time, there was hardly any interest in the sector: in our case, we even found it impossible to find analysts with whom we could compare Greek banks, simply because there was no interest whatsoever.

Added to this was a widely held narrative about the supposed obsolescence of the traditional banking model. There was talk of the unstoppable advance of big tech companies into financial services, the rise of new neobanks and a process of disintermediation that, according to many, would render banking as we knew it unrecognisable. The leveraged nature of the banking business itself, problems with capital generation and mistrust generated by episodes of poor corporate management also weighed heavily. The mistakes of the past left a stigma that was difficult to erase, and the market, to a large extent, continued to judge the sector on the basis of what had happened years ago, rather than on the reality of its balance sheets and its ability to generate profits in the new environment.

But the environment had changed dramatically. Taking Spain as an example, it went from a system with more than 50 banks to a market now dominated by five large banks. The range of financial products on offer was significantly reduced, but demand for these services remained high: deposits, loans, consumer credit, payments and transfers, among others. And despite narratives about the threat posed by neobanks or big tech companies, the reality is that none of them has managed, at least for now, to completely replace traditional large-scale financial intermediation.

Furthermore, the anomalous situation of near-zero and even negative interest rates was left behind as financial conditions normalised after 2020. The combination of a sector with far fewer players, better capitalisation, growing structural demand for financial services and an environment of rising interest rates began to be reflected in a very significant improvement in banking results. In this context, and with valuations remaining extraordinarily low, investment in the sector began to make sense.

And so we did, selectively adding several European banks, both regionally and pan-European: **CaixaBank**, **Sabadell**, **Bankinter**, **UniCredit**, **Commerzbank**, **ING** and **Eurobank**, among others. The cycle had changed and the sector was beginning to enter a dynamic of recurring profit generation and capital strengthening. Once comfortable



solvency levels had been reached, surplus capital began to be increasingly allocated to shareholder remuneration through dividends and share buyback programmes, thus reinforcing the potential returns on these investments. The business was working, and the shares of these businesses began to react positively.

With returns that, in some cases, have more than quadrupled, and remaining faithful and consistent with our investment process, we believe that current share prices already reasonably reflect the value of European banks in general. We have therefore decided to rotate part of our exposure to the banking sector towards other areas of the market which, in terms of narrative and negative perception, remind us of the situation of European banks a few years ago.

European car manufacturers and chemical companies

European car manufacturers and the chemical sector are a clear example of this. Market sentiment towards both sectors is frankly pessimistic. In the automotive sector, factors such as European regulation, which is self-defeating in many respects, growing Chinese competition and the difficulty some manufacturers have in offering a range of vehicles that are attractive and affordable to consumers are weighing heavily. In the case of the chemical industry, the market is discounting an adverse scenario marked by structurally higher energy costs in Europe, Asian competition (which sometimes even undercuts costs) and a growing bureaucratic and regulatory burden that erodes competitiveness.

This combination of factors has generated a clearly negative consensus, which is reflected in depressed valuations for many companies in both sectors. Precisely for this reason, and as part of our natural portfolio rotation, we currently see opportunities in these areas which, due to their characteristics and the prevailing market sentiment, remind us of European banking a few years ago. It is no coincidence that several of these companies are currently part of Magallanes' fund portfolios.

Focusing on the automotive sector, where we hold investments such as **Volkswagen, Porsche AG, Renault** and **Stellantis**, a detailed analysis offers some reasons for greater optimism. Firstly, in the regulatory sphere, the European Union has begun to show greater willingness to review and adapt some of the most demanding measures, both in terms of emissions targets and the ban on the sale of combustion vehicles after 2035, introducing a degree of flexibility that reduces some of the pressure on the sector.

Secondly, with regard to Chinese competition, market share data reflect a more nuanced reality than the prevailing discourse suggests. The share of European manufacturers has remained virtually unchanged from the previous year. It is true that Chinese manufacturers continue to gain ground, with a share of around 7%, but this progress has mainly been at the expense of other more comparable competitors, especially Japanese and Korean ones.

Finally, European manufacturers are beginning to regain competitiveness, not only in terms of brand and product, but also in terms of price. The case of the electric Renault 5 is particularly illustrative: just twelve months after the start of production, it has already sold more than 100,000 units, and **Renault** has established itself as the third largest car brand in Europe, with passenger car sales growth of +5.9%, more than double that of its competitors, and also leading the growth in electric vehicles.



However, one need only look at the share prices (and, therefore, the valuations) at which many of these companies are trading to conclude that the market is discounting an almost terminal scenario, as if they were going to disappear in the next five years. However, the evolution of the business, the adaptability shown and, above all, the profits they continue to generate point in a very different direction.

As an illustrative example, we can take the case of **Renault**, which is present in the European fund and currently has a market capitalisation of around €9.5 billion. However, within the group there are assets whose value, according to our calculations, is very significant in itself: its financial division, RCI Banque, valued at around €6 billion; its stake in **Nissan** is approximately €3 billion; and, in addition to all of the above, there is €7 billion in net cash on the balance sheet. Together, these three elements would total around €16 billion, i.e. some €6.5 billion above its current market value.

The anomaly is even more evident when we put it in context with the business's cash generation. **Renault** has generated approximately €1.3 billion in cash in 2025 and expects to generate at least €1.6 billion in 2026. In other words, at current market prices and discounting the cash on the balance sheet, buying **Renault** is equivalent to paying 1.5 times the estimated free cash flow for 2026. In our opinion, this is a valuation that is difficult to justify and, precisely for this reason, particularly attractive.

Among car manufacturers, we made a new purchase at the end of the year: Spain's **EBRO EV Motors**. The investment thesis is based on the fact that **EBRO EV Motors** combines the relaunch of a historic Spanish brand with existing industrial capacity and a top-tier technology partner, allowing it to grow with a cost structure that is very different from that of a traditional manufacturer. In this regard, the replacement value of the industrial assets is particularly noteworthy: rebuilding facilities comparable to the former **Nissan** factories in Barcelona from scratch would have required a very high investment, no less than €1.5 billion according to our estimates, while **EBRO EV Motors** acquired them for approximately €70 million, a difference that is difficult to replicate in the sector.

Added to this is the strategic agreement with **Chery**, which allows **EBRO EV Motors** to access already developed platforms and technology, avoiding a disproportionate initial outlay on R&D and accelerating the launch of models, in exchange for a reasonable payment scheme per vehicle produced, aligned with the growth of the business. The result is a significantly lighter fixed cost base, which is already reflected in the income statement: with just over 14,000 cars sold in 2025, the company has managed to reach operational break-even point and has achieved a market share of close to 2% in Spain in its first commercial year, a particularly significant figure given the speed with which it has been achieved. This combination of low-cost industrial assets, "proven" technology and an aligned and highly competent management team led by its founder and main shareholder, Rafael Ruiz, constitutes, in our opinion, **EBRO EV Motors'** main competitive advantage.

Rotation

At the end of 2025, we carried out a significant rotation in the portfolios. In general terms, we sold or reduced exposure to sectors whose upside potential, according to our estimates, was already practically exhausted, realising very significant capital gains, as in the case of European banks, which we mentioned earlier.



We have allocated these resources to companies that are currently more penalised by the market but which, in our opinion, have attractive upside potential and a clearly superior future earnings trajectory.

In practice, we have almost completely exited banks to reallocate capital to sectors such as chemicals, energy, automotive, airlines, construction and distribution, among others.

As a result of these moves, the implied upside potential of the Funds' portfolios has increased significantly. In the European Fund, the estimated upside has increased to +60%, trading at very attractive multiples of 12x P/E and 1x book value, with a dividend yield of around 4.3%. In the Iberian fund, the potential rises to +45%, with multiples of 12.5x PER and 1.4x book value and a dividend yield of 4%.

Active Management at Magallanes

The result of this rotation is funds with attractive future upside potential despite recent rises, trading at low multiples compared to the market and, in our opinion, a portfolio that is better positioned for the current and future economic climate, whatever that may be.

This is precisely one of the main differences between active management and an index-based strategy. In general terms, very high returns in a single year should lead investors to exercise extreme caution: the more an asset rises, the more likely it is that part of its future potential has already been incorporated into the price. However, in an active management strategy, this effect can be reversed and improved through rotation: we realise profits on those positions where the price already largely reflects the value we estimate, and we reallocate that capital to new opportunities that, in our opinion, offer a greater margin of safety and a more attractive upside.

Indexed investing, on the other hand, tends to do just the opposite, being forced to replicate the index, increasing the weight of what has risen the most (and is therefore usually more expensive) and reducing exposure to what has fallen, without the ability to discriminate between price and value. We try to act in the opposite way, maintaining and even improving the aggregate potential of the portfolio, regardless of what has risen in the past. In other words, the securities that have accounted for a large part of recent returns no longer occupy the same place, because they have been replaced by others with greater potential that were not there before. The fund is the same, the vehicle is also the same, and the investment process does not change; what changes, and must change, is the composition of the portfolio.

In line with the above, in the **European** fund, as we mentioned, we have sold the positions in the banks mentioned above with very significant capital gains. In other sectors, we have sold our position in **Shelf Drilling** after receiving a takeover bid from ADES International Holding Ltd., a Saudi group specialising in drilling services.

On the buying side, it is worth highlighting the addition of two UK companies which, from our perspective, illustrate two investment themes that we consider relevant: **RS Group** is a leading global distributor of industrial and electronic products, with more than 750,000 references for the maintenance, repair and operation of industrial and electronic equipment, with a presence in more than 30 countries and a highly diversified customer



base. The importance of distribution businesses lies in their structural resilience, based on supplying components and solutions that enable other companies to operate, regardless of the economic cycle, which provides long-term visibility and strength.

Persimmon plc is one of the UK's leading housebuilders, focusing on the construction of new homes under brands such as Persimmon Homes and Charles Church. We find this sector particularly attractive due to the expected housing cycle in the UK: structural demand remains high in the face of limited supply, which should support volumes and margins in the coming years.

In addition, we have increased our exposure to stocks already in the portfolio, such as **Valterra Platinum, Husqvarna, Noble Corporation, Syensqo, Evonik, Brenntag, Porsche AG** and **Volkswagen**, among others, thus adjusting the portfolios towards positions with greater future potential within our defined valuation and risk frameworks.

In the **Iberian** fund, we have added **EBRO EV Motors**, mentioned above, and **Befesa**, a leading company in the recycling of hazardous industrial waste (mainly steel dust and aluminium salt slag). Its main competitive advantage lies in the fact that it provides an essential service that is required by regulation, with very high barriers to entry due to the need for specific technology, environmental permits and operational scale. Furthermore, at the purchase price, we believe the company was trading below its replacement value, which reinforces the attractiveness of the investment from a valuation perspective.

Thank you

We sincerely appreciate the trust you have placed in us over the years, entrusting us with the management of €3.8 billion, distributed among nearly 30,000 co-investors, national and international, retail and institutional, who make up the great Magallanes family.

A year ago, we celebrated our tenth anniversary. Looking back, we are very pleased to see how far we have come together with you: not only because of the results we have achieved, but also because of the close relationship and alignment we have built with our co-investors over time.

On behalf of the entire Magallanes team, I would like to reiterate our gratitude and our commitment to continue managing with the same dedication, discipline and responsibility in the years and decades to come.

Sincerely yours,

Iván Martín Aránguez, CFA
Chief Investment Officer

MAGALLANES



VALUE INVESTORS

ANNEX 1. RETURNS BY FUND AND CLASS as of 31/12/2025

MAGALLANES IBERIAN EQUITY, FI

FUND	NAV	3 M	6 M	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015 ¹	SINCE INCEPTION	INV. LEVEL
Magallanes Iberian Equity FI "M"	281,2229	7,78%	15,59%	44,53%	18,40%	13,30%	-1,82%	18,69%	-12,92%	6,02%	-9,22%	15,45%	15,48%	8,04%	172,72%	93,8%
Iberian benchmark		10,53%	23,24%	52,30%	8,75%	22,58%	0,65%	9,08%	-8,96%	16,47%	-10,78%	11,19%	3,11%	-5,07%	129,49%	
Magallanes Iberian Equity FI "P"	296,9821	7,91%	15,88%	45,25%	18,99%	13,87%	-1,33%	19,28%	-12,48%	6,55%	-8,76%	16,03%	16,09%	6,32%	182,25%	93,8%
Iberian benchmark		10,53%	23,24%	52,30%	8,75%	22,58%	0,65%	9,08%	-8,96%	16,47%	-10,78%	11,19%	3,11%	-10,89%	115,42%	
Magallanes Iberian Equity FI "E"	322,3988	8,12%	16,32%	46,34%	19,89%	14,72%	-0,58%	20,18%	-11,83%	7,35%	-8,07%	16,91%	16,91%	12,72%	222,40%	93,8%
Iberian benchmark		10,53%	23,24%	52,30%	8,75%	22,58%	0,65%	9,08%	-8,96%	16,47%	-10,78%	11,19%	3,11%	3,52%	150,25%	

¹ Class M 29/01/2015; Class P 26/02/2015; Class E 09/01/2015. Returns net of fees. Iberian benchmark: 80% MSCI Spain Net TR + 20% MSCI Portugal Net TR.

MAGALLANES VALUE INVESTORS UCITS IBERIAN EQUITY – LUXEMBOURG

FUND	NAV	3 M	6 M	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016 ¹	2015	SINCE INCEPTION	INV. LEVEL
Magallanes Iberian Equity Lux "R"	243,8836	8,02%	15,71%	44,58%	17,48%	13,64%	-2,40%	17,93%	-13,94%	5,68%	-9,61%	14,79%	16,33%	-	143,88%	98,8%
Iberian benchmark		10,53%	23,24%	52,30%	8,75%	22,58%	0,65%	9,08%	-8,96%	16,47%	-10,78%	11,19%	0,52%	-	141,74%	
Magallanes Iberian Equity Lux "I"	257,1692	8,17%	16,02%	45,37%	18,11%	14,28%	-1,87%	18,53%	-13,51%	6,21%	-9,14%	15,42%	16,99%	-	157,17%	98,8%
Iberian benchmark		10,53%	23,24%	52,30%	8,75%	22,58%	0,65%	9,08%	-8,96%	16,47%	-10,78%	11,19%	0,52%	-	141,74%	

¹ Class R 31/12/2015; Class I 31/12/2015. Returns net of fees. Iberian benchmark: 80% MSCI Spain Net TR + 20% MSCI Portugal Net TR.

MAGALLANES EUROPEAN EQUITY, FI

FUND	NAV	3 M	6 M	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015 ¹	SINCE INCEPTION	INV. LEVEL
Magallanes European Equity FI "M"	260,9422	9,91%	15,44%	28,36%	-1,91%	21,15%	4,94%	23,49%	-3,30%	21,48%	-19,19%	19,52%	12,89%	3,47%	161,98%	96,9%
European benchmark		6,25%	9,99%	19,39%	8,59%	15,83%	-9,49%	25,13%	-3,32%	26,05%	-10,57%	10,24%	2,58%	0,42%	110,46%	
Magallanes European Equity FI "P"	275,6897	10,05%	15,73%	29,02%	-1,42%	21,76%	5,47%	24,11%	-2,81%	22,09%	-18,78%	20,12%	13,45%	4,23%	177,46%	96,9%
European benchmark		6,25%	9,99%	19,39%	8,59%	15,83%	-9,49%	25,13%	-3,32%	26,05%	-10,57%	10,24%	2,58%	0,43%	110,48%	
Magallanes European Equity FI "E"	299,2070	10,26%	16,17%	29,97%	-0,68%	22,67%	6,26%	25,04%	-2,08%	23,01%	-18,17%	21,02%	14,31%	4,29%	199,21%	96,9%
European benchmark		6,25%	9,99%	19,39%	8,59%	15,83%	-9,49%	25,13%	-3,32%	26,05%	-10,57%	10,24%	2,58%	9,77%	130,06%	

¹ Class M 27/01/2015; Class P 29/01/2015; Class E 09/01/2015. Returns net of fees. European benchmark: MSCI Europe Net TR.

MAGALLANES VALUE INVESTORS UCITS EUROPEAN EQUITY – LUXEMBOURG

FUND	NAV	3 M	6 M	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016 ¹	2015	SINCE INCEPTION	INV. LEVEL
Magallanes European Equity Lux "R"	247,0043	9,72%	15,34%	29,76%	-2,18%	21,01%	5,20%	23,17%	-3,82%	20,89%	-19,43%	19,11%	18,30%	-	162,76%	94,8%
European benchmark		6,25%	9,99%	19,39%	8,59%	15,83%	-9,49%	25,13%	-3,32%	26,05%	-10,57%	10,24%	9,39%	-	123,49%	
Magallanes European Equity Lux "I"	260,3372	9,87%	15,66%	30,47%	-1,65%	21,67%	5,77%	23,80%	-3,33%	21,50%	-19,00%	19,76%	27,76%	-	197,57%	94,8%
European benchmark		6,25%	9,99%	19,39%	8,59%	15,83%	-9,49%	25,13%	-3,32%	26,05%	-10,57%	10,24%	19,66%	-	144,49%	
Magallanes European Equity Lux "P"	269,6718	9,97%	15,86%	30,93%	-1,31%	22,10%	6,14%	24,26%	-2,96%	21,96%	-18,70%	20,16%	12,08%	-	169,67%	94,8%
European benchmark		6,25%	9,99%	19,39%	8,59%	15,83%	-9,49%	25,13%	-3,32%	26,05%	-10,57%	10,24%	2,58%	-	109,58%	
Magallanes European Equity Lux "ING"	189,1000	9,99%	18,04%	38,13%	-5,92%	19,12%	12,05%	16,14%	2,15%	14,72%	-19,91%	-	-	-	89,10%	94,8%
European benchmark		6,30%	12,11%	26,08%	3,61%	13,13%	-4,36%	17,37%	-3,32%	26,05%	-10,57%	-	-	-	78,81%	

¹ Class R 29/01/2016; Class I 12/02/2016; Class P 31/12/2015; Class ING 17/01/2018. Returns net of fees. European benchmark: MSCI Europe Net TR.

MAGALLANES MICROCAPS EUROPE, FI

FUND	NAV	3 M	6 M	2025	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017 ¹	2016	2015	SINCE INCEPTION	INV. LEVEL
Magallanes Microcaps Europe, FI "B"	173,3935	2,66%	6,27%	23,34%	-2,55%	13,51%	-9,42%	45,60%	-0,61%	10,59%	-21,98%	12,37%	-	-	73,39%	97,6%
European benchmark		1,42%	6,43%	16,27%	2,51%	-0,32%	-24,87%	25,67%	18,66%	22,39%	-13,38%	8,14%	-	-	52,59%	
Magallanes Microcaps Europe, FI "C"	168,8500	2,59%	6,14%	22,98%	-2,59%	13,20%	-9,67%	45,10%	-1,16%	10,10%	-22,18%	7,81%	-	-	62,28%	97,6%
European benchmark		1,42%	6,43%	16,27%	2,51%	-0,32%	-24,87%	25,67%	18,66%	22,39%	-13,38%	7,22%	-	-	51,28%	

¹ Class B 17/03/2017; Class C 31/03/2017. Returns net of fees. European benchmark: MSCI Europe Micro Cap Net Total Return.